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The History of 
Refugees in Lebanon 
before the Syrian 
Confl ict 
While it was going through major internal 
shift of governments – from being part of 
the Ottoman Empire to an independent 
Republic through the French dominance –
Lebanon started welcoming major 
populations of refugees as early as 1915. 
Armenian Refugees After the 1915 Genocide 
and 1939 Turkish Dominance  
The Armenian genocide of 1915 and the 
Kemalist uprising against the French rule 
imposed by the Sykes-Picot agreement in 
1920 led to a first wave of Armenian 
refugees in Lebanon. At that time, modern 
Lebanon was part of Ottoman Syria. The 
influx stopped on February 9, 1921 with the 
recapture of Gaziantep by the French forces. 
The conflict was settled by the Ankara 
Agreement on October 20, 1921. France 
made several territorial concessions to 
Turkey, including Sicilia were many 
Armenian were living. From 1922 to 1930, 
reinforced Turkish intimidation over its 
minorities led more Armenian to flee. While 
most of refugees found shelter in Cyprus, 
Egypt, and Syria, the orphanages were 
transferred to Lebanon.1 In August 1922, 
some 400 Armenian orphans from Sicilia 
reached Beirut. Overall, 800 Armenian 
families are believed to have fled to Syria 
and Lebanon while no exact number exists.2 
Armenian refugees were well integrated in 
Lebanon and Syria. On August 30, 1924, the 
French High Commissioner in Syria and 
Lebanon issued two decrees (Nos. 2825 and 
2825bis) by which Lebanese and Syrian 
nationalities shall be conferred en bloc to all 
ex-Ottoman subjects residing in the 
territories of Lebanon and Syria.3 The decree 
n°2825 legally created the Lebanese 
nationality, which used to be attached to 
Syria or the Ottoman Empire. Armenian 
refugees who arrived in Lebanon before 
January 1925 were naturalised. As for those 
who arrived later on, they were given the 
same benefit on the condition of five year’s 
continuous residence in Lebanon and Syria.4 
Although many Armenian refugees left 
Lebanon during the Civil War, around 
170,000 well-integrated Armenians still 
reside in Lebanon.  
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Palestinian Refugees After the 1948 and 
1967 Wars  
When the Arab-Israeli conflict broke out in 
1948, 100,000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon 
and were not allowed to return.5 More 
Palestinians arrived later into the 1960s and 
1970s due to sporadic conflicts following 
the Six-Day War in 1967. 
Lebanon adopted a mixed policy towards 
Palestinian refugees. On the one hand, the 
country gave citizenship to about 50,000 
Christians during the 1950s and 1960s. In 
the mid-1990s, about 60,000 Shia Muslim 
refugees were also granted citizenship. This 
generated protest from the Maronite 
authority, leading to the Lebanese 
citizenship being given to all Palestinian 
Christian refugees.6 On the other hand, apart 
from the Christians, Palestinians were far 
less lucky. 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were 
described as “the most unfortunate and 
destitute grouping of Palestinian refugees in 
any Arab host country”.7 Lebanon’s official 
stance was always to defend the 
Palestinians’ right of return, in line with UN 
resolution 194, and to leave the 
responsibility of Palestinians refugees to the 
UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 
Twelve official Palestinian refugee camps 
were built, in which half of Palestinian 
refugees live.  
The government’s (non)management of 
Palestinian refugees has exacerbated the 
marginalisation of this group from the rest 
of the population. The policy of 
“containment” has meant that Palestinian 
refugees have limited social and civil rights,8 
no access to public social services and very 
limited access to public health or 
educational facilities.9 Palestinians were 
granted the full right to work as any other 
foreigner in 2010 only. Moreover, 
Palestinian refugees were not allowed to 
own, sell, and bequeath property.10 
The UN describes the situation of 
Palestinian refugees as a “protracted refugee 
situation”, defined by the UNHCR as “one 
in which refugees find themselves in a long-
lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their 
lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights 
and essential economic, social, and 
psychological needs remain unfulfilled after 
years in exile”.11  
The deterioration of Palestinian refugees’ 
living conditions coupled with the beginning 
of the Syrian civil war led thousands of them 
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to migrate to Europe12. A census completed 
in January 2018 found that only 175,000 
were still living in Lebanon,13 while another 
study placed the number between 260,000 
and 280,00014 and the UNRWA estimates 
varies between 400,000 and 500,000.15 
Since 2011, 32,000 more Palestinian 
refugees in Syria fled to Lebanon16. They 
have been subjected to a separate and strict 
policy. From mid-2013, their entry into 
Lebanon was conditioned to a pre-approved 
visa application made by a guarantor in 
Lebanon.17 In May 2014, entry was only 
possible if a Palestinian individual has an 
embassy appointment, is transiting to a third 
country or with a pledge of responsibility.18 
Iraqi Refugees After the 1991 and 2003 
Wars  
Lebanon experienced two main waves of 
Iraqi refugees. 10,000 – mostly Christians 
and Shia – reached the country of cedars in 
the early 1990s, fleeing Saddam Hussein's 
regime as well as the hardships of 
international sanctions.19 As a direct result 
of the instability and violence that followed 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 20,000 more Iraqi 
refugees sought refuge in Lebanon. Their 
number reached between 40,000 and 45,000 
after the February 2006 bombing of al-
Askari Mosque in Samarra.20 
The majority of Iraqi refugees are not legally 
allowed to stay in Lebanon. A survey 
realised by the Danish Refugee Council in 
2007 estimates that 71% of Iraqis surveyed 
had illegal status, and 95% of them reached 
Lebanon by being smuggled across the 
Syrian-Lebanese border.21 As a result, many 
Iraqi refugees live informally with little 
access to services or legal employment. The 
illegality of their stay in Lebanon makes it 
impossible to estimate how many of them 
currently live in Lebanon. 
UNHCR granted refugee status on a prima 
facie basis to all Iraqi nationals from central 
and southern Iraq who have sought asylum 
in Lebanon from 2007. Nonetheless, 
Lebanon did not give legal effect to the 
UNHCR's recognition of Iraqi refugees until 
2011. Before that date, some report pointed 
to hundreds of arrests and detentions of Iraqi 
refugees without valid visas or residency 
permits.22 Under article 32 of Lebanon's 
1962 Law of Entry and Exit, foreigners who 
enter Lebanon illegally are liable to a prison 
sentence of between one month and three 
years, a fine, and deportation. 
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Lebanon’s Refugee 
Population 
Because of the sensitivity of religious 
balance and the fifteen-year civil war, no 
national census has been conducted since 
1932, that is, before the founding of the 
modern Lebanese state. As for July 2017, 
the Lebanese population was believed to 
amount more than six million. The migrant 
population is mainly composed of Syrians, 
Palestinians, Iraqis, and Sudanese. Smaller 
numbers are from various African and Asian 
countries such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh.23 
With more than 1,5 million Syrians and over 
450,000 long-term Palestinian refugees, 
Lebanon has the highest per capita 
concentration of refugees in the world. 
Refugees represent almost one third of the 
Lebanese population. The number of 
refugees started decreasing in January 2018 
only, when the number of registered Syrian 
refugees dropped to below one million for 
the first time since 2014. 
Lebanon’s Legal 
Framework on 
Refugees before the 
Syrian Conflict 
The Absence of a Domestic Legal 
Framework for Refugees   
Lebanon is not a party of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention nor its 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. The Lebanese 
government has repeatedly stressed that 
Lebanon is neither a country of asylum, nor 
a country of resettlement. The status of 
refugees falls into the scope of the 1962 Law 
Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners 
in Lebanon and their Exit from the 
Country.24 Article 26 states that “Every 
foreigner who is persecuted or sentenced for 
a political crime outside Lebanon, or whose 
life or liberty is threatened on account of 
political activity, may apply for asylum in 
Lebanon”. Only the article 31 ensures the 
non-refoulement for a former political 
refugees. However, asylum has been granted 
on the basis of this disposition only once.25 
As for Syrians, the history of close ties 
between Syria and Lebanon led the countries 
to sign two bilateral agreements. The 
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Fraternity, Cooperation, and Coordination 
Treaty was concluded on May 22, 1991 and 
complemented by the Agreement for 
Economic and Social Cooperation and 
Coordination on September 16, 1993. In the 
context of the Syrian intervention in the 
Lebanese civil war, the agreements allowed 
reciprocal freedom of movement, residence, 
and property ownership. As a result, circular 
migration between the two countries was 
characteristic of their economy.26 Syrian 
workers were estimated to number around 
400,000 before the onset of the war in 
March 2011.27 At the beginning of the 
Syrian conflict, those agreements enabled 
Syrian refugees to enter Lebanon via official 
border crossings.  
In 2015, the Lebanese government declared 
that the Syrian refugee crisis was not 
governed by law but by governmental 
decisions. Hence, national laws and bilateral 
agreements presented above have been 
continuously sidestepped.28 
Lebanon’s legal framework for the treatment 
of refugees lies on the 2003 Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) signed between the 
country and the UNHCR. In the case of the 
Syrian refugees, Lebanon and the European 
Union agreed on major bilateral deals in 
early 2016.  
The 2003 Memorandum of Understanding 
Between Lebanon and the UNHCR   
On the one hand, the Memorandum allows 
the UNHCR to register asylum seekers in 
Lebanon and to proceed their application for 
refugee status. The agreement also 
authorises registered refugees to obtain a 
temporary circulation permit up to twelve 
months. Individuals who hold this permit are 
exempt from arrest and detention for being 
in the country illegally.29 
On the other hand, the MoU (re)affirms that 
“Lebanon does not consider itself an asylum 
country” and specifies that an “asylum 
seeker” defines “a person seeking asylum in 
a country other than Lebanon”.30 This 
definition reveals that Lebanon still refuses 
the 1951 Convention’s definition of refugee. 
The term “refugee” is actually not used in 
the Lebanese context. Finally, the UNHCR 
is responsible of finding a solution to 
resettle the refugees outside of Lebanon. 
Furthermore, the UNHCR is not permitted 
to freely register Syrian refugees without the 
previous consent from the Lebanese 
government. In April 2015, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs requested that UNHCR de-
register over 1,400 Syrian refugees who had 
arrived in Lebanon after 5 January 2015.31 
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In May 2015, Lebanese authorities imposed 
a new ban on Syrian refugees registrations. 
This temporary suspension was supposed to 
enable the government to establish a new 
mechanism for registration of refugees. The 
UNHCR was compelled to stop monitoring 
Syrian refugees, including those already in 
the country and new arrivals.32 
Syrian Refugees in 
Lebanon 
When the UNHCR started monitoring 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon in February 
2013, they were 113,243. Registrations 
increased drastically in April 2013 to reach 
1,191,332 in September 2014. Eventually, 
the number of Syrian refugees slowly 
decreased to stabilise between 991,000 and 
one million in 2017. In January 2018, it 
dropped to below one million for the first 
time since 2014. However, it is not clear 
how many have actually returned to Syria. 
Moreover, reports pointed to practices of 
deportation and forced return in Lebanon. 
Finally, all Syrian refugees are not registered 
with the UNHCR. Since the suspension of 
new registration of Syrian refugees, the 
UNHCR stopped recording individuals 
awaiting to be registered. Syrian refugees 
are believed to be about 1,5 million in 
Lebanon, that is, more than one fourth of the 
total population, as of February 2017. 
Syrians who fled the conflict in their home 
country come mainly from Damascus Homs 
and al-Qusayr, close to border with 
Lebanon, and from Jebel Saman, Idlieb, al-
Ma’ra, and Hama in northern Syria. Most 
notably, many Syrians seeking shelter in 
Lebanon come from al-Raqqa district which 
is closer to Turkey or Jordan than Lebanon. 
There are no formal Syrian refugee camps in 
Lebanon. Before the onset of the Syrian 
conflict, twelve Palestinian camps managed 
by the UNRWA existed. Evidence shows 
that few Syrians live in those camps, 
especially on a short-term period. However, 
no estimates of their number are known.33 
According to the UHCR, about 12% of 
refugee households live in informal 
settlements (tents from timber, plastic 
sheets, etc.), 17% lives in non-residential 
buildings (worksites, garages, shops), and 
the remaining 71% live in regular 
apartments, houses, or doorman rooms. 
Syrian refugees are scattered across 
Lebanon, with Bekaa (36.1%), Beirut 
(26.3%), North Lebanon (25.6%) and South 
Lebanon District (12.0%) hosting the larger 
population. More than a third of Syrian 
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refugees live in the poorest regions of 
Lebanon such as Bekaa, Akkar and 
Baalbeck-Hermel. This has created a major 
burden for the local communities which 
were in humanitarian needs before the crisis.  
In spite of the efforts made by the Lebanese 
government and the help of UNHCR and 
other external aid to cope with the massive 
influx of refugees, 76% of Syrians 
households live below the poverty line of 
US$3.84 per person. The figure reaches 
more than 80% in the districts bordering 
Syria. This represents an increase of almost 
30% since 2014.34 55% of Syrian refugees 
are children under 18 years old, with 49% 
under 15 years old. Finally, 66% of 
households have at least one member with a 
specific need. The largest share of 
households is reported having one or more 
members with a chronic illness, while one 
third of households include a member with a 
temporary illness.35 
Lebanon’s Syrian 
Refugees Policies 
The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon is 
highly politicised and the government’s 
stance can be explained by the major 
antagonistic political parties’ conflicting 
loyalty to diverse actors of the conflict in 
Syria. 
Lebanon’s Policy of Dissociation and 
Openness to Syrian Refugees 
At the early stages of the Syrian conflict, 
Lebanon was praised for its open borders 
and non-encampment policy. The bilateral 
agreements of 1991 and 1993 enabled 
Syrian refugees to enter Lebanon via official 
border crossings. At the condition that they 
could provide a valid Syrian identity 
document, Syrian refugees received an 
“entry coupon” and “entry stamp” that 
granted them legal residency for a period of 
six months. This initial authorisation could 
be renewed free of charge for another six 
months. Over one year, Syrians had to pay 
US$200 per person in order to renew their 
residency.36 Yet, several NGOs pointed to 
the unaffordable costs of those coupons, 
which are granted at the discretion of 
General Security and thus, not guaranteed.37 
The ambiguity of the government’s response 
was exacerbated by the coming into power 
of Prime Minister Naguib Maqati who 
established a policy of neutrality under the 
label “disassociation policy”. This policy 
was declared with the Baabda Declaration in 
mid-2012. It was thought as a way to 
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preserve the fragile balance between the 
various sectarian forces in Lebanon and to 
avoid the “spillover” of the conflict.38 On 
the one hand, for the 8 March Alliance – a 
coalition comprising the influential 
Hezbollah, as well as the Shia Amal 
movement and some Christian, Druze and 
Sunni groups – Bashar al-Assad’s regime is 
an important political and military ally to be 
supported. On the other hand, the 14 March 
Alliance – a coalition of parties formed after 
the 2005 Cedar Revolution to end the Syrian 
occupation – are in favour of supporting the 
anti-Assad revolt. This alliance is led by the 
Sunni Future party and comprises Christian 
and Druze parties. In other words, the pro 
and anti-Assad movements in Syria mirror 
the sectarian divides in Lebanon.  
While the neutrality of Lebanon allowed 
thousands of Syrians to seek refuge in the 
country, as time passed and number of 
refugees grew, there was fear that the 
presence of a large number of mostly Sunni 
Syrian refugees will alter the demographic 
balance and interests between the Sunni, 
Shia and Christian sects and political groups.  
A few months after the resignation of Prime 
Minister Miqati in March 2013, the new 
government closed 18 unofficial border 
crossing-points.39 The policy of 
disassociation came to an end with the 
military involvement of Hezbollah on the 
side of al-Assad. The much feared spillover 
effect of the Syrian conflict destabilised 
Lebanon. The Sunni Nusra Front (later 
renamed Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) engaged in 
cross-borders fighting with the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF). This led a growing 
section of the Sunni Lebanese population to 
believe that the LAF was cooperating with 
Shia Hezbollah against Sunni populations, 
especially in the North of the country in 
Tripoli and Arsal where al-Nusra was 
gaining control.40 Simultaneously, elements 
of the Nusra Front and IS began infiltrating 
regions close to the Syrian border. In June 
2014, Lebanese authorities imposed further 
restrictions on Syrian refugees when it 
declared that only those in fighting areas 
bordering Lebanon would be allowed to 
enter.41 In October 2014, the Lebanese 
government took two major steps towards 
the securitisation of Syrian refugees. 
The Creation of a Legal Framework to 
Support Host Communities  
As a first step, Lebanon decided to 
cooperate with the UN in the development 
of the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 
(LCRP). The three-year program was 
launched in 2014 by the Minister for Social 
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Affairs. It sets up three main strategic 
priorities: 1) ensuring humanitarian 
protection and assistance primarily to Syrian 
de facto refugees and the poorest Lebanese, 
2) strengthening the capacity of national and 
local public delivery systems to 
accommodate the basic needs of the 
aforementioned people, and 3) supporting 
Lebanon’s economic, social, institutional 
and environmental stability.42 The LCRP 
was renewed until 2020. The 2018 response 
plan appealed for US$2.68 billion to provide 
humanitarian assistance, as well as invest in 
Lebanon’s public infrastructures, services 
and local economy.43 
The LCRP is the Lebanese application of the 
Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) 
in response to the Syria crisis, and is co-
managed by the UN and the Lebanese 
Minister of Social Affairs. The 3RP was 
launched by the UN in December 2014, 
replacing the former inter-agency Regional 
Response Plan to the Syrian refugee crisis. 
The 3RP 2015-2016 attempted to design a 
comprehensive regional strategy to integrate 
humanitarian and development efforts to 
address the protection and assistance of 
refugee populations, and the resilience and 
stabilisation of host communities.  
Yet, the regional engagements made by 
Lebanon clashed with its domestic “October 
Policy” of securitisation of Syrian refugees. 
Instead, the 3RP and LCRP were used as a 
channel to attract financial help and to fund 
the resilience of Lebanese populations.  
The “October Policy” and the Securitisation 
of Syrian Refugees  
Faced with the deterioration of national 
security, the Lebanese government approved 
a “Policy Paper on Syrian Refugee 
Displacement”, known as the “October 
Policy”. It acknowledges three main goals 
regarding the displaced Syrians: (1) reducing 
the number of Syrians by limiting their 
access to Lebanon and by encouraging them 
to return to Syria, (2) increasing security 
regulations of the Syrians, and (3) easing the 
burdens of both local and national 
authorities.44 The General Security, the 
branch of state security responsible for 
dealing with foreigners, was given the 
mission to impose strict controls and 
interfere in the daily life of Syrians. 
Simultaneously, the LAF intensified their 
raids on Syrian refugee camps.45 In the 
realm of politics, the Syrian refugees crisis 
was used by politicians in order to assert 
their nationalistic credentials.  
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The restrictive “October Policy” was 
implemented through a series of rules on 
entry, residency, renewal and regularisation, 
enacted on January 5 and 13, 2015, and on 
February 3 and 23, 2015.46 This policy was 
criticised and thought to “deny entry to 
poorer Syrians, while keeping the borders 
open to those who enjoy good financial 
standing”.47 Human rights defenders accused 
the policy to “manufacture vulnerability”48 
and pointed to many arrests, detentions and 
forced returns.49 Moreover, no provision 
specifically deals with individuals fleeing 
armed conflict, violence or persecution and 
seeking safety in Lebanon. Instead, the 
regulations apply to less urgent cases such as 
business, tourist entries, or medical needs.  
The Cooperation with International Donors  
In February 2016 at the London Pledging 
Summit, Lebanon and the European Union 
concluded the “Lebanese Compact” deal to 
support vulnerable populations in Lebanon. 
This pact was annexed to the EU/Lebanon 
Priorities, a document that sets out mutually 
agreed priorities for cooperation until 2020, 
focusing on 1) fostering growth and job 
opportunities, 2) governance and rule of law, 
and 3) regional stability, security and 
countering terrorism.50 As for Syrian 
refugees, Lebanon pledged to allow their 
temporary stay. In exchange, European 
states committed around €400 million to 
support Lebanese policies.  
However, expectations were not met and 
Lebanon imposed further restrictions on 
residency for Syrians, pushing those who 
could not afford the costly renewal of 
residency permits into increased 
precariousness and insecurity. Several 
commentators argued that those harsh 
policies were a way to force Syrian refugees 
to leave Lebanon without going against the 
principle of non-refoulement.51 
Policy Variations at the Sub-National Level  
At the sub-national level, the absence of a 
unified government and the resulting “non-
policy” towards Syrian refugees allowed a 
certain degree of decentralisation in policy 
implementation.52 Identity politics and 
political economy are notably influential. 
As for identity, confessionalism has been 
influential. Shia Hezbollah initially 
welcomed and assisted Syrian refugees for 
two main reasons. First, the Hezbollah 
remained thankful to the Syrians who 
opened their door to Lebanese fleeing the 
Israeli bombardments in 2006. Second, 
Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, openly 
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insisted that the Syrian war must stay out of 
Lebanon.53 Over time, the Shia party 
followed the securitisation stance of the 
Lebanese government and enforced a strict 
management of Syrian refugees. In 2016 and 
2017, Hezbollah was involved in several 
cases of forced returns and refoulements.54 
As for areas controlled by Sunni majority, 
they have been most tolerant to the Syrian 
refugee presence. Although some 
municipalities have implemented strict rules 
over Syrians such as curfews, most of them 
encouraged socio-economic integration like 
in Tripoli and Sidon.55  
Finally, Christian areas seem to have 
mediated their response according to social 
class instead of religious identity.56 Wealthy 
Syrians were often more likely to be 
integrated into a wealthy Christian area. The 
perception of economic opportunity to seek 
international aid to cope with the influx have 
encouraged several mayors to use curfews 
and deny services to camps as an indicator 
of social tensions and need for assistance. 
 
The Socio Economic 
Impact of Syrian 
Refugees on Lebanon  
Although the Syrian refugee crisis had 
undeniable effects on Lebanon’s economy, 
the country has long suffered from the 
regional instability. Syria is Lebanon’s main 
trade partner and transit grounds. After the 
conflict, Lebanon’s exports had to rely on 
more expensive sea shipments and lost 
significant market shares, especially in the 
Gulf and in Iraq. Altogether, exports have 
decreased by one third since 2011.57 Hence, 
the Syrian crisis not only led to a slowdown 
in consumer confidence, investment and 
tourism; but also to a direct negative impact 
on services and goods imports/exports. 
Macro-economic Impact 
The World Bank estimates that direct costs 
of the Syrian refugee crisis amount US$400 
million per year, while indirect costs are 
believe to exceed US$2.5 billion in terms of 
the erosion of public services.58 Public 
spending increased by US$1 billion between 
2011 and 2014, subtracting 2.9 percentage 
points annually to Lebanon’s GDP growth.59 
Lebanese Social Affairs Minister Derbas put 
the direct cost of the refugee crisis at US$7.5 
14 
billion between 2012 and 2014, that is 17% 
of GDP.60 
Economic growth averaged just 2% during 
the 2011–2016 period, having averaged 
9.2% between 2007 and 2010. In 2011, 
when Syrian refugees arrived en masse, 
Lebanese GDP dropped to barely 1%. From 
2012 to 2015, as a result of slower growth, 
Lebanon's average standard of living 
worsened, with real per capita GDP marking 
an 8.3% drop, representing a total loss of 
US$726 million.61 While the UNHCR 
described the living conditions of Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon worst than ever,62 
Lebanese population is also getting poorer.  
Moreover, Lebanon continues to face large 
fiscal deficits. The country has the eighth 
largest debt burden in the world, with almost 
US$70 billion, or 147% of GDP.63 
Instability resulting from the Syrian crisis 
and costs associated with the refugee 
population exacerbate the government's 
precarious fiscal situation. 
Syrian refugees also have a positive impact 
on Lebanon’s economy, especially on public 
revenues. Since the onset of the crisis until 
2016, state revenues grew by almost 
US$600 million.64 The purchase of basic 
goods in the local markets by more than one 
million refugees boosted revenues from 
consumption taxes. The same applies to the 
telecommunications sector. The number of 
subscribers to mobile telephony in Lebanon 
increased by about 400,000 between 2013 
and 2016. Finally, residence permits for 
Syrian refugees have been a major source of 
taxation for the government. Lebanon 
imposes a fee of US$200 per year after one 
year in the country and for all Syrians aged 
15 and above. If only 20% of concerned 
people renew they permit each year,65 
Lebanon still increased its revenues from 
US$35 million to 50 million from residence 
fees between 2011 and 2015.66  
Furthermore, Lebanon has received large 
amounts of foreign aid from the 
international community in order to cope 
with the influx of Syrian refugees and 
strengthen the Lebanese population’s 
resilience to the crisis. According to official 
figures, the country receives roughly US$1.5 
billion each year.67 At the February 2016 
Supporting Syria and the Region conference 
in London, the international community 
pledged around US$833 million in grants 
and US$241 million in loans to Lebanon. 
During the last CEDRE conference in Paris 
in April 2018, Lebanon won pledges of 
grants and loans exceeding US$11 billion.68 
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The positive impact of Syrian refugees is 
stronger at the local level. In 2016, Syrian 
refugees consumed locally an average of 
US$106 per capita, which represents 
roughly US$1.5 billion per year. These 
estimates are based on the official number of 
registered refugees. The real figures are thus 
probably much higher. This boost of private 
consumption, although modest, contributed 
to the economic growth of Lebanon. Finally, 
many Syrian refugees who settled in 
Lebanon from the onset of the Syrian crisis 
are part of the bourgeoisie from Damascus 
and Aleppo. Although most of the wealthy 
Syrians settled in Europe, the US or the Gulf 
countries, a minority came to Lebanon and 
invested in the country’s real estates, private 
education and companies.69 
Impact by Economic Sector  
Structural transformations initiated before 
the Syrian conflict were paused by the 
massive inflows of Syrian refugees. 
Increased competition over access to public 
services and infrastructures has caused 
social tensions, especially between the 1,5 
million Syrian refugees and as many 
Lebanese vulnerable individuals. 
The Syrian refugee crisis has underscored 
the weak electricity system in Lebanon and 
forced authorities to address the energy 
sector issue. The entire service is subsidised 
by the government and thus reliant on public 
resources. Syrian refugee influxes created an 
additional burden on the electricity system. 
According to the LRP 2017-2020, 45% of 
Syrian refugees meet their demand in 
electricity through illegal connections to the 
national grid.70 This led to significant 
technical damages, increased maintenance 
costs, and reduced supply quality and 
quantity for host communities. A study 
undertaken by the Ministry of Energy and 
Water (MoEW) and UNDP revealed that an 
additional 486 megawatts of power supply 
are needed to cover the demand of the 1,5 
million displaced Syrians in Lebanon.71 
586,540 Syrian refugees in Lebanon are 
between the age of 3 and 18, which 
represents half of the total Syrian refugee 
population in the country. 9,797 other 
Palestinian refugees from Syria are under 
18. Finally, 451,323 Lebanese children are 
in need of education assistance. For the 
2016-2017 school year, a total of 250,000 
non-Lebanese children and 5,251 Palestinian 
children from Syria were enrolled in formal 
or non-formal education programs.72 The 
education costs are mainly supported by the 
government, putting more pressure on public 
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finances. The average annual costs of public 
basic education are over US$1.000 after 
donor’s contribution.73 In spite of those 
efforts, more than half of school-aged Syrian 
children are out of school. Public schools 
suffer the most from the impact of pressure 
on education system. Although 67 have been 
opened since 2011, they are saturated. 
Teachers must cover double shifts without 
receiving fair financial compensation, which 
means that children spend less time in the 
classroom. Finally, the recruitment of 
additional teaching staff is a burden on 
public finances. All those constraints impede 
the quality of education and teaching in the 
country for both Syrians and Lebanese. 
The impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on 
the health sector is considerable. All Syrian 
refugees, whether they are registered with 
the UNHCR or not, have free access to 
primary healthcare facilities. Between 
January and September 2017 only, 878,481 
consultations were provided to Syrian 
refugees in Lebanese infrastructures. During 
the same period, 61,257 Syrians were 
admitted for hospital care, at an average of 
6,806 admissions per month.74 According to 
official figures, public hospitals have 
accumulated a deficit of US$15 million 
between 2011 and 2016. This is mainly due 
to the inability of Syrian refugees to cover 
for hospitalisation fees after surgery. 
Moreover, Lebanon has witnessed a 27% 
increase in tuberculosis rates since 2011.75 
Finally, the country is lacking staff, 
equipment,76 and medication77.  
Consequently, Lebanese have decreased 
access to primary health care because of 
perceived reduced quality of care, 
overcrowding, and increased waiting time. 
In 2016, 91% of Syrian refugees were still 
considered food insecure, especially in 
southern districts and in areas bordering 
Syria. Syrian refugees spend more than 50% 
of their monthly expenditures to buy food, 
which shows their extreme vulnerability.78 
The refugee crisis also had great impact on 
Lebanese livelihood. The agricultural sector, 
which represents a large part of food 
production capacity in Lebanon, has been 
greatly impacted. 15% of the refugee 
population is scattered across 4,881 informal 
settlements, with the majority located on and 
near agricultural lands.79 Furthermore, prices 
of basic goods have soared due to the 
increase in population and demand, the 
injection of cash and food/cash vouchers for 
Syrian refugees, and the reduced access to 
cheaper goods from Syria. 
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Inflation also affected housing and the 
vulnerable Lebanese populations who are 
unable to cope with this rise. A 44% 
increase in rents was reported between June 
2012 and June 2013 only.80 In Beirut, the 
situation is dramatic. In some districts of the 
capital, rents are believed to have increased 
by up to 400%81. The 445,000 Lebanese 
who live under the poverty line have no 
access to adequate housing.82 The inflation 
is directly linked to the influx of Syrian 
refugees, which creates pressure on the 
demand for apartment. 73% of the Syrian 
population is leaving outside informal 
settlements. This forced several Syrian 
families to live in common crowed 
apartments in order to lower renting costs. In 
2017, 33% of Syrians refugees lived in 
shelters with less than 4.5m2 per person.83 
Not to mention the rent paid to tent owners 
in informal camps, varying between US$100 
and US$160 per household.84 
While Lebanon enjoys a favourable water 
endowment, the Syrian refugee crisis 
highlighted the poor resilience of the water 
management in Lebanon. Before the crisis, 
only 8% of all water consumed was treated 
before being send to the environment.85 
Since 2011, the demand on water increased 
by an estimated 8 to 12%, straining the 
country’s resources. The impact has been 
especially strong for the agricultural sector 
which accounts for 61% of total water 
demand. This increased demand and 
following shortage has led refugee and local 
community to over rely on alternative 
sources such as water delivery by truck, 
unsafe wells or illegal network tapping. This 
resulted in the creation of an unregulated 
parallel water supply market where rates are 
200 to 300% higher than public water fees.86 
Finally, the environment has been greatly 
impacted by the influx of Syrian refugees, 
arming host communities and straining 
public finances. Between 2012 and 2014, 
municipal spending on waste disposal, 
particularly in Akkar and Bekaa, has 
increased by 40%,87 while 92% of sewage 
was running untreated into water sources. As 
a result, in 2017, wastewater pollution had 
increased by 33%. As for air pollution, it is 
also increasing due to the overreliance of 
refugees and host communities on diesel 
generators for electricity generation.88 
Finally, the non-encampment policy of the 
Lebanese government led many Syrian 
families to settle on and close to forest and 
agricultural lands. This has resulted in 
massive land degradation and firewood 
depletion.  
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Impact on the Labour Market  
The most tangible impact of Syrian refugees 
is seen on the existing job opportunities, 
wage level and working conditions. Some 
voices consider that the presence of Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon is the main cause of 
rising unemployment. The co-relation is 
undeniable. Since the onset of the Syrian 
crisis, the labour force has increased by 50% 
in the country. In 2017, the World Bank 
estimated that the Lebanese economy should 
need to create six times as many jobs just to 
absorb the regular market entrants.89 While 
official figures announce 10% of 
unemployment in Lebanon, in March 2018, 
President Michel Aoun directly pointed to 
Syrian refugees as the main cause of 
unemployment rate’s rise to 46%.90 
Simultaneously, International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) estimates that half of the 
working-age Syrian refugees are active.91 
The competition is particularly high in the 
informal sector that contributes to more than 
56% of total employment.  
Not only skilled job have become highly 
competitive, but it has become more difficult 
to even acquire low-paid jobs. The fact that 
Syrian refugees are accepting lower incomes 
and longer work hours without any social 
benefit presents direct challenge to job 
opportunities for Lebanese. Syrian refugees 
have an average monthly income of 
US$277, 40% lower than the minimum 
monthly average for Lebanon of US$448.92 
As a result, labour market standards have 
sunk.93 Recent estimates suggest that 
unskilled wages in some areas have fallen by 
as much as 50%.  
However, some advocate that the massive 
influx of Syrian refugees on the Lebanese 
labour market is less conductive to real 
competition.94 On the one hand, the majority 
of Syrian refugees are under 24 and did not 
have access to education. They thus turn to 
the illicit sector or third sector. On the other 
hand, Lebanese have a high enrolment rate 
in secondary education and university. They 
turn to the private sector. As a consequence, 
the structural gap between Syrian refugees 
and Lebanese is not problematic. While this 
suggests that Syrians do not compete 
directly with Lebanese in the access to the 
labour market and job opportunities, it is 
likely that Syrians directly compete with 
other immigrants. Indeed, the majority of 
Syrians workers are active in agriculture, 
construction and personal and domestic 
services, which have traditionally been 
dominated by migrant workers. 
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In February 2015, faced with the mounting 
social unrest, Lebanon suspended the right 
to work for Syrian refugees. Lebanese 
authorities issued new regulation about 
Syrians’ entry and residency in Lebanon. 
According to those new rules, Syrians 
renewing their residency permits on the 
basis of an UNHCR registration certificate 
shall sign a pledge not to work.95 As for 
Syrians with work permit, their employment 
was restricted to the third sector, mainly in 
construction, agriculture and cleaning 
services.96 Those Syrian refugees must pay a 
US$80 fee for their work permit. The fee 
rose to more than US$300 for other sectors, 
and the employer must prove his/her 
inability to find an adequately skilled 
Lebanese worker for the same job. Those 
restrictions result in the inability of Syrian 
refugees to meet their basic needs and put 
them in more precarious living conditions.  
Political Impact   
The political legitimacy of the Lebanese 
regime is based on the fragile balance 
between three different sectarian groups. 
The demographics has been dramatically 
altered by the influx of Syrian refugees, 
many of them belonging to the Sunni sect.  
Moreover, the security situation has 
deteriorated since the arrival of Syrian 
refugee populations in Lebanon. As early as 
2013, a national poll addressing Lebanese 
perceptions toward the Syrian crisis revealed 
that 52% of the interviewees believed that 
Syrians refugees are threatening national 
stability and security. 98% presumed Syrian 
refugees are taking jobs from the local 
population, and another 50% thought that 
the refugees are benefiting from financial 
aid in an unfair manner.97 
In 2014, radical armed groups associated 
with the Islamic State and al-Nusra Front 
arrived to Lebanon and were thought to 
recruit directly in vulnerable refugee 
populations. A series of security accidents 
led to the engagement of the Lebanese 
Armed Forces with these groups in 2014. 
To conclude, Lebanon’s confessional 
systems, population pressure, the strain on 
municipalities, and the degrading livelihoods 
of vulnerable groups contribute to a situation 
that could lead to deepened social divisions 
and strongest social unrest. 
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